Windows users on certain versions of Microsoft software are vulnerable to a zero-day exploit discovered yesterday. Microsoft released security advisories and a fix-it-tool to address this vulnerability, and Jaime Blasco of AlienVault (@jaimeblascob) quickly released a great analysis with in-depth intelligence on the attack.
So far, the attack seems to be a targeted operation. We are only seeing around 25 users on OpenDNS network being affected. We pulled the DNS footprints of the users who requested the CnC server krickmart.com on November 4th and mapped their geo locations.
As shown in the map, a majority of the affected users are located in Pakistan. This aligns with Jaime Blasco’s observation that this attack is targeting Pakistanis. Several users were also spotted in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Hungary, so we suspect that targets exist outside of Pakistan alone. We urge all Windows users who have installed software listed by Microsoft’s security advisory to check their system for IOC (Indicator of Compromise) information detailed in Jaime Blasco’s analysis.
We can also share a quick summary of pDNS analysis of this attack to hopefully shed a bit light for the attack infrastructure analysis.
CnC servers Country
220.127.116.11 Russian Federation
18.104.22.168 Russian Federation
22.214.171.124 Anonymous Proxy
126.96.36.199 Czech Republic
Here is a list of domains hosted on the above IP addresses:
krickmart.com. www.krickmart.com. ns1.krickmart.com. ns2.krickmart.com. maptonote.com. irc.cetyeri.net. www.maptonote.com. ns1.maptonote.com. ns2.maptonote.com. myflatnet.com. ebayforboots.net. ns1.myflatnet.com. lampur.com. dinapigi.co.uk. mail.dinapigi.co.uk. ns2.dinapigi.co.uk. www.dinapigi.co.uk. ns1.lampur.com. ns2.lampur.com. lampur.com. www.lampur.com. appworldstores.com. file-panda.com. android.play.store.file-panda.com. ns1.appworldstores.com. ns1.file-panda.com. ns2.appworldstores.com. ns2.file-panda.com. similerwork.net. www.similerwork.net. intertechsupport.net. lampur.com. dinapigi.co.uk. mail.dinapigi.co.uk. ns2.dinapigi.co.uk. www.dinapigi.co.uk. ns1.lampur.com. ns2.lampur.com. lampur.com. www.lampur.com. twikstore.com. ns1.twikstore.com. ns2.twikstore.com.
While hunting down all potential CnC servers, we noticed an interesting similarity of the server configuration across these domains. It might not turn out to be relevant, but this configuration isn’t typically seen compared to the random sample of 50,000 headers we analyzed below. As a result, we conclude that the same attackers are running all the servers in the attack.
Server: Apache/2.2.24 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.24 OpenSSL/1.0.0-fips mod_auth_passthrough/2.1 mod_bwlimited/1.4 FrontPage/188.8.131.5235 Accept-Ranges: bytes Transfer-Encoding: chunked Content-Type: text/html